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Recommendations for Future Work 
My one hope for this work is that it will tum people to Christ. Nothing else. I pray that 
GOD will bring us to our knees before Him as He graciously reveals to us the emptiness 
with which we have filled our lives. However, we cannot simply sit idly and expect such 
a revolution. I desire that, having read this, we will discuss the matter with each other, 
whether we are in or outside the body of Christ. As Christians, we should not only 
converse over this, but more steadfastly seek the good and perfect will of GOD for us, 
His children. 
Looking forward to possible additions, this labor feels far from complete. Drawing from 
the format of Simon Wiesenthal's Sunflower and Bellah's Habits a/the Heart, I hope to 
add a segment of responses from a wide audience - from Christians of all backgrounds, 
those of different faiths, and those who claim no religious beliefs at all. Lord willing, He 
will bring me to delve deeper into this matter both in a historical-cultural and spiritual 
sense. Without a doubt, I could see this being the springboard for later graduate work. 
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Hi MaryAnnn, ~ 
I had to have surgery a onday and I am just now able to get up a little. the gradu ion office 
called and told my ents that if my grade was not changed soon I would not be can idered 
graduating in m anc;l would have to reapply. I have enclosed an attachment of my nal paper 
because I will ot be able to bring another copy down. 
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Preface 
The genesis of this project was a story on the weekly-televised newsprogram, 
Dateline. This particular program aired sometime in 1995 and recounted the stories of 
three American prisoners of war from World War II who had suffered tremendous abuse 
at the hands of their captors. The twist in the story was uncovered when it was revealed 
that one of the worse abusers was then living a comfortable life as a multi-millionaire in 
Japan. The prisoners of wars' tormentor was known in 1945 only as "the Raven", which 
was the nickname given to him by the prisoners because of his gaunt bird-like features. 
The investigators for Dateline tracked the man known as the Raven to an exclusive 
neighborhood in Japan. Having been informed by legal experts that any statute of 
limitations had passed, the man admitted to being the camp commander known as the 
Raven. I wondered how this could have happened, how this person could have escaped 
punishment. Upon researching these questions for a freshman English Composition class, 
I discovered that the Hoskins Special Collection at the University of Tennessee held 
original manuscripts of prosecutor and defense notes that dealt with this case. 
Colonel Henry Lyons was a native of Greenville, Tennessee who served as the 
Judge Advocate General of the Eighth Army at the close of World War II. When Colonel 
Lyons died in the late 1970's his family donated the papers regarding the Yokohama 
Trials to the University of Tennessee. The Colonel Henry Lyons Papers at the University 
of Tennessee Hoskins Special Collections, Manuscript 953, consist of eight bankers type 
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boxes containing legal sized manila folders. The folders are divided into different cases 
and further divided into prosecution and defense exhibits and notes. Among the papers are 
photographs, and copies of depositions. The papers contain handwritten notes made 
during the trial that include possible objections to certain items being introduced, as well 
as notes on depositions regarding items that may be inadmissible. The papers are a rich 
source of information as to legal strategy that was to be employed during the hearings. 
Upon completion of my freshman paper, I realized there were many questions 
unanswered. When the opportunity arose to write a senior thesis, I knew my topic. The 
original design was changed with knowledge I gained in an international law class. With a 
new design in hand that proposed to trace under what elements the United States claimed 
jurisdiction and finally a case analysis, I began my research. Due to problems in obtaining 
case material, the design of the project changed very late in my last semester. As a whole 
vision, this project is far from finished. The new design will attempt to trace through the 
sources of international law what the law regarding war crimes was in 1945 and how this 
presented unique challenges to the creation of the trials. 
Chapter I: Introduction 
The Visigoths of ancient times first introduced the Western World to the concept 
of "total war" in which a battle would be fought with no other object than absolute victory 
with the complete annihilation of the enemy. The Visigoths did not take prisoners, nor did 
they show mercy to those wounded on the battlefield. Western customs did not accept this 
version of war and has been reflected on throughout the Western Tradition. 
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Grotius, who is considered the father of international law, wrote: 
Now for my part, being fully assured ... that there is some Right 
common to all Nations, which takes place both in the Preparation and 
in the Course of War, I observed throughout the Christian World a 
licentiousness in regard to war, which even barbarous nations ought 
to be ashamed of: a running to arms upon very frivolous or rather no 
occasions; which once being taken up, there remained no longer any 
reverence for right, either divine or human, just as if from that time 
men were authorized and finnly resolved to commit all manners of 
crimes without restraint ... but far must we be from admitting the 
conceit of some, that the obligation of all right ceases in war; nor 
when undertaken ought it be carried on beyond the Bounds of justice 
and fidelity. i 
Grotius' observations reflect the lack of international treaties and conventions to govern 
actions during times of armed conflict. This changed late in the Nineteenth century with 
the first convention regarding the laws of war. With the implementation of conventions, 
there still remained issues that remained to be addressed such as how the laws of war 
would be regulated and enforced in a time of chaos. 
Prior the end of World War II, news and of atrocities committed by Japanese 
soldiers against American prisoners of war were made public in the United States. The 
Japanese mistreated prisoners of war in several infamous incidents such as the Bataan 
Death March and later in the Palawan Massacre, which occurred when the Japanese lines 
of communication were severed towards the end ofthe war.ii When the Japanese began to 
realize the war was not going to end in their favor, it was alleged that there was a standing 
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order that in the event all communication was lost, commanders of prisoners of war camps 
should assume the worst was upon them, and immediately execute prisoner so that they 
would not be a factor in a fight to the last man. Prior to the surrender the Japanese 
destroyed any such documentation that this was a standing order. iii 
One example of the news of Japanese atrocities was the Palawan Massacre of 
United States prisoners of war. Palawan is a small island in the Philippines. Palawan is 
located in a tropical area, capable of providing adequate shelter, food, water, and 
sanitation facilities. When communication was lost with the central Japanese Command at 
Camp lOA and American reconnaissance planes were spotted near the island, the camp 
commander ordered all the prisoners of war be placed in bomb shelters and set on flfe. iv 
Anyone seen trying to escape the flames was shot. A few American prisoners escaped the 
flames and gunfire by jumping over cliffs to report first hand accounts.v A few days later 
American forces landed at Palawan and secured the island.vi At this time, preliminary 
reports were taken from prisoners of war who survived the flames and gunfire and a 
Graves Registration team was called in to commence collection of remains. Charred 
remains of United States Service members, dog tags, and personal gear were found in a 
shallow unmarked mass grave.vii Americans quickly rallied around the legendary heroes 
of Bataan and Corregidor and demanded retribution. 
In response to the demand for retribution, The International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE) was established as the Pacific Theatre's equivalent ofthe 
Nuremberg Trials. Although numerous accounts, explanations, and volumes have been 
written about the Nuremberg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
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East, very little scholarly investigation has been made into the lesser Class B and Class C 
trials that were conducted by a military commission under the direction of the Eighth 
Army Judge Advocate General Corps. There was little doubt that Japanese forces were in 
violation of conventions that dictated the standard of treatment of prisoners of war, but 
questions emerged as to the way in which persons would be held accountable, and what, if 
any, punishment would be meted out to individuals who acted outside the command 
responsibility. 
The importance of the Yokohama Trials in establishing a doctrine for tribunals 
designed to punish acts perpetrated by individuals during times of hostilities cannot be 
under estimated. In the aftermath of World War I, many problems emerged in trying 
prisoners of war and as a result very few convictions were handed down, all of which 
related to the actual conduct ofthe war and not with atrocities committed by individuals. 
At Yokohama the world first witnessed the large-scale implementation of international 
law and interpretations as to the way in which it related to individuals. 
Public opinion often drives governmental policies, and this was the case in the 
1940's. Americans were sharply divided on how war criminals should be apprehended, 
tried, and punished. Many Americans remembered the outcome of the war crimes trials 
that took place after World War I that were at best a farce. The final outcome of the war 
crimes trials from World War I resulted in six convictions and the carrying out of very 
few, if any, real penalties. viii In the 1940's, International Law was less defined than it is in 
the dawn ofthe twenty-first century. The Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I 
demanded that William II, the former emperor of Germany be publicly arraigned and 
6 
Stoffell 7 
charged with violating the laws and customs ofwar.ix William was never tried and instead 
lived the remainder of his natural life in exile at an estate in Holland.' William was not 
charged with a crime that was defined or punishable under any code of intemationallaw.'i 
Articles 228-229 of the Versailles Treaty allowed the allied powers to bring 
Germans accused of war crimes to trial before an international military tribunal in cases 
where individuals were accused of violating the laws and customs ofwar.'ii These persons 
were latertried at the German Supreme Court, but received sentences that were not carried 
out or enforced.'iii This ambivalence led many Americans to believe that Allied forces 
should not undertake the expense of trying persons accused of war crimes, especially in 
light of the staggering amount of monetary outlay that would come in the rebuilding 
process after the war. Part of the decision to undertake war crimes trials was partly driven 
by political promises that were made by both the British Prime Minister and President 
Roosevelt. 
In a speech seeking the creation of a War Crimes Investigation Commission, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill declared to the House of Lords in October 1942 that: 
The Commission would investigate crimes against the nationals of 
the United Nations, recording the testimony available, and the 
commission would report from time to time to the governments of 
those nations in which such crimes appear to have been committed, 
naming and identifYing whenever possible, the names and identities 
of the persons responsible. The aim would be to collect material, 
supported whenever possible by depositions or other documents to 
establish such crimes, especially when they were systematically 
perpetrated, and to name and identify those responsible for their 
perpetration.'iv 
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The same day, President Roosevelt released a announced that: 
It is not the intention of this government or the intentions of 
governments associated with us that we should resort to mass 
reprisals. The number of persons eventually found guilty will 
undoubtedly be extremely small compared to the total enemy 
population, but it is our intention that just and sure punishment will 
be meted out to those responsible for the cornmission of atrocities 
that have violated every tenet of the Christian faith. xv 
Despite the Prime Minister's and the President's declarations that war crimes would be 
dealt with, there was no discussion as to the way in which these persons would be 
apprehended or how jurisdiction and procedural questions would be overcome. 
Although several stern warnings were given through speeches, State Department 
Bulletins, and official communications warning of retribution for war crimes, the official 
intention of the allied powers in the Pacific Theatre to prosecute persons for war crimes 
arrived in the Potsdam Declaration. The Potsdam Declaration, signed by Great Britain, 
The United States and China stated that, "We do not intend that the Japanese should be 
enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice should be meted out to all war 
criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."xvi The Potsdam 
Declaration would later become one of the primary instruments upon which the United 
States proposed to claim jurisdiction to try war criminals. 
On August 14, 1945, official word was transmitted through the Swiss Government 
that Japan unconditionally surrendered and would abide by the provisions set forth in the 
Potsdam Declaration:vii Upon receipt of this notification, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed 
8 
Stoffe1l9 
that General Douglas MacArthur be appointed the Supreme Allied Commander to receive 
the Japanese surrender, accompanied by high-ranking officers of Allied Forces.xviii 
Clearly, the United States had played the dominant role in the Pacific Theatre and would 
hold a dominant role in the surrender, occupation, and rebuilding of Japan. 
The Commission to try suspected war criminals was appointed by General 
Douglas MacArthur. This commission would face many issues and challenges that were 
presented by the fluid nature of international law . The focus of this work is not a 
sweeping overview of Allied Trials, but an examination of applicable International Law in 
1945 with a specific focus on the creation of the Yokohama Trials. 
Chapter 11- The Problem of International Law in Establishing War Crimes 
Trials in 1945 
Introduction 
Following the close of World War Two, opinions regarding the disposition of war 
crimes was sharply divided. Legal experts such as Harvard Law School's Sheldon Glueck 
were coming to accept that "All is not fair in war and the mere wearing of a uniform is 
neither justification nor excuse for criminalistic and gratuitously cruel practice, most of 
which are wholly unconnected with military necessity. "xix Conventions governing the 
Laws of War had been ignored by Axis powers, creating a clear violation of international 
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law; however there was no mechanism to impose or enforce sanctions. The question then 
arose if individual malefactors were liable for their actions, as well as the states. This issue 
was further exasperated due to sharply divided sentiments among the American people. 
As Allied victory became more likely in late 1944, legal scholars began to conjecture 
on how war criminals would be treated under existing intemationallaw. These 
suppositions were tempered with public opinion and attitudes toward the Axis powers. 
Some Americans were skeptical that the atrocities that were reported to have been 
perpetrated by the Germans and Japanese actually took place; the reports were simply too 
horrific to be true."" The skeptics held that even in the chance the atrocities had been 
committed, ultimate responsibility rested with the state and therefore could not be held 
accountable in any court. The Treaty of Versailles that had ended World War I was the 
first attempt in any peace between belligerent nations to establish some sort of punishment 
for actions that were taken during times of conflict. ""i 
In opposition to the skeptics were the people who wanted vengeance on all Germans 
and Japanese, regardless of their participation in the war. These people felt that the 
Germans and Japanese as a state and as a people should have been debilitated to the extent 
that they would not longer be able to participate in aggressive behavior, and that the 
collective group should be punished for the military actions of the state. In addition to the 
renewed feelings of anger and hate, there were many people who believed war criminals 
would go unpunished, as they had in World War I, allowing for future violations of 
international law without fear of sanctions. 
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After World War I, there was an inability on the part of Allied Powers to overcome the 
question of international law and how it was to be applied to war crimes. Following the 
Treaty of Versailles, Allied Powers publicly arraigned the fonner Gennan Emperor 
William II and charged him with "supreme offenses against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties," which was followed by the creation of a tribunal to proceed with 
trial.xxii This trial never occurred, and as previously stated, William II lived out the 
remainder of his life. With this in mind, legal scholars began readdressing the issues of 
international law that had been raised after World War I, which was primarily included 
asking where was the law to be found, who would conduct the trials, and was it possible to 
hold individuals accountable for actions taken during the conflict. 
The Sources of International Law 
In the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, eleven nations participated with 
the primary responsibility for investigating, apprehending suspects, and trials falling on 
the United States, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, China, the Philippines, 
France, Russia, and Canada. uiii India would later become involved, desiring to send a 
justice to serve as am impaneled judge well after the deadline to submit a nominee. The 
Justice that was to be administered was a combination and a reflection of each state's 
domestic law, foreign policy and political objectives. This created a unique question: were 
the Japanese given a fair trial and subsequent sentence, or as Richard Minear has 
suggested, was this a case of "victor's justice"?XXiV To examine this question, it is 
necessary to look at the law that governed the definition of criminality, the sources of 
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governing law, and basis of jurisdiction, and finally at specific proceedings not conducted 
in the international sphere of Tokyo, but in the smaller trials at Yokohama, which were the 
exclusive domain of the United States. 
The Yokohama Trials were not international in scope as the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East had been. The sole responsibility for the investigation of 
suspected war crimes, apprehension of suspected individuals and their trial and 
punishment fell on the United States, and particularly the Eighth Army under the 
command of General Douglas MacArthur. Unique problems were then presented to the 
persons responsible for overseeing the conduct of the trials. 
One of the major questions facing the victorious nations following World War II was 
whether or not there was actually any crimes committed, and if so, how to charge, try, and 
punish the malefactors. The "laws of war" (jus in bello) were codified only in a sketched 
outline hailing from The Hague Conventions of 1899 with subsequent revisions and 
additions in 1907 as well as the Red Cross Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of 
1929."xv With no international body creating legislation, there was the question of whether 
or not any actual crime had been committed.l<l<Vi Some legal scholars argue that States are 
considered sovereign, and therefore their actions are not subject to scrutiny from other 
states. While this is continually debated, there is a general consensus that there is a 
dynamic body of practices that govern the behavior of sovereign states. 
Much of international law is created through ancient and customary usage, as well as 
treaties. In trying to determine the way in which international law is to be applied, it is 
necessary to examine the sources of international law. The standard sources of 
12 
Stoffelll3 
international law were not codified until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) carne into 
existence in the twentieth century. The ICJ recognized that in addition to codified 
international law in the form of treaties and conventions that there is an element of 
customary international law. In keeping with the positivist nature oflaw, states began to 
tum away from "natural law" and began to rely more on what was the actual practice of 
the state and the reflection of the political will. Article 38(l)(b) of the Statute for the 
International Court of Justice states that international custom is accepted as law in the 
event there is no binding treaty or convention governing states' behavior.l<Xvii Louis 
Henkin describes this in the following excerpt: 
One of the norms of international law created by custom authorizes the 
states to regulate their mutual relations by treaty. The reason for this 
validity of the legal norms of international law created by treaty is this 
custom created norm. The presupposed basic norm of international law, 
which institutes custom constituted by the State as a law creating fact, 
expresses a principle that is the basic presupposition of all customary 
international law: the individual ought to behave in such a manner as the 
others usually behave, applied to the mutual behavior of states, that is, the 
behavior of the individuals qualified by the national legal orders as 
government organs. l<Xviii 
Although ascertaining customary law governing the treatment of prisoners of war held in 
the Pacific theatre in 1940 is difficult due to cultural differences, the series of treaties and 
conventions governing the detention and treatment of prisoners of war are readily 
available. 
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The Hague Convention of 1899 was one of the earliest codified agreements as to 
the way in which prisoners of war would be apprehended and maintained during times of 
conflict. Participants in the convention included Germany, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Great Britain, The United States of America, Mexico, France, India, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Persia, Russia, Romania, Serbia, Siam, 
Norway, and Bulgaria. Although the Hague Convention of 1899 was created to further 
define the customs and laws of war that had originally been codified for modern times at 
the Brussels Conference of 1874, the convention suffered from vagueness due to the 
inability ofthe plenipotentiaries to reach agreements on several aspects. xxix 
In the preamble of the Hague Convention of 1899, the plenipotentiaries declare 
that "until a more complete code of the laws of war are issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by 
them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public 
conscience." The plenipotentiaries recognized that all possible aspects of international 
law could not be addressed in the absence of a central legislative body that was charged 
with promulgating the rules and laws of war. 
Chapter II of the Hague Convention of 1899 deals with prisoners of war and 
outlines the treatment that combatants as well as non-combatants were to receive. Article I 
ambiguously states that all individuals captures must be "humanely treated," which is 
further explained in the subsequent articles. xxx The Convention allows for the use of 
14 
Stoffell15 
prisoners of war to provide labor so long as "the tasks are not excessive"xxxi This would 
exclude prisoners of war from performing many tasks that were demanded from them by 
the Japanese, including working for 12-15 hours straight in the heat and humidity of the 
Philippines where the largest majority of American prisoners of war were interned.xxxii 
The most significant passage of the Hague Convention of 1899 is Article 8, which 
states: 
Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders 
in force in the army of the State in the power they are. Any act of 
insubordination warrants the adoption towards them of such 
measures of severity as are necessary. Escaped prisoners who are 
retaken before being able to rejoin their own army, or before 
leaving the territory occupied by the army that captured them, are 
liable to disciplinary punishment. xxxiii 
Many cases tried at Yokohama dealt with abuse of prisoners that the Japanese felt was 
justified under the regulations of the Imperial Army. Some examples are disembowelment 
for attempting to escape, which was punished under a desertion clause in the Japanese 
Military Field Manual."",iv There were no reservations in the Hague Convention of 1899 
that would have disavowed this practice. 
The Hague Convention of 1907 modified the provisions of the 1899 Convention. It 
had become clear to the international community that the provisions of the 1899 
Convention were inadequate to prescribe treatment for prisoners of war and that changes 
had to be made to further define the expectations of the detaining country. 
15 
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The most significant changes to intemationallaw in relation to prisoners of war 
arose with the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, which is also known as the 
Red Cross Convention of 1929. 47 governments signed the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Japan and the USSR did not sign the convention.J<XXv 
On August 31,1942 Japan agreed to abide by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 
1 929.J<XXvi The 1929 Convention greatly improved protections offered to prisoners of war. 
With the wide spread invention of electronic photographic media, one of the first 
provisions included in the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 was that 
"Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or 
formation which captured them. They shall at all times be humanely treated and protected, 
particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public curiosity. Measures of 
reprisal against them are forbidden."J<XXvii This passage criminalized photographing 
prisoners of war and attempting to insure that prisoners were not the subject to public 
spectacles. This passage was also designed to alleviate the general maltreatment of 
prisoners in regard to everyday abuses such as slapping and hitting.""xviii 
The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 also dictated the amount 
of time that prisoners of war could be marched on a single day either in changing places of 
internment or reaching a primary facility. Part II Section I article 7 of the Convention 
states that "the evacuation of prisoners on foot shall in normal circumstances be effected 
by stages of not more than 20 kilometers per day, unless the necessity for reaching water 
and food depots requires longer stages. mix The previous conventions on the treatment of 
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prisoners of war had not addressed the movement of POW's to or between facilities, and 
this became an important aspect of intemationallaw regarding the treatment of prisoners. 
The 1929 Convention also went much further in dictating the living conditions of 
the prisoners of war. Part II Section III Article 10 states" prisoners of war shall be lodged 
in buildings or huts which afford all possible safeguards as regards hygiene and salubrity. 
The premises must be entirely free from damp, and adequately heated and lighted. All 
precautions shall be taken against the danger of fire. As regards dormitories, their total 
area, minimum cubic air space, fittings and bedding material, the conditions shall be the 
same as for the depot troops of the detaining Power." xl 
An important aspect that the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 
expanded on was the amount of food that prisoners were to receive. xli Chapter II article 11 
of the Convention states that "the food ration of prisoners of war shall be equivalent in 
quantity and quality to that of the depot troops. Prisoners shall also be afforded the means 
of preparing for themselves such additional articles of food as they may possess. 
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to them. All collective disciplinary measures 
affecting food are prohibited." The Hague Convention of 1907 had stated that prisoners 
were to receive adequate food and water, but the 1929 Convention placed the expectation 
that prisoners would receive food amounts of the quality provided to the detaining 
nation's regular troops. 
Another important aspect of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 was 
the dictation of what type of work could be performed by prisoners of war. The 1929 
Convention stated that "work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct connection 
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with the operations of the war. In particular, it is forbidden to employ prisoners in the 
manufacture or transport of arms or munitions of any kind, or on the transport of material 
destined for combatant units. "xlii The plenopetionaries of the Hague Convention of 1907 
had not been able to reach this agreement and had instead stated that prisoners of war 
could be utilized for labor that supported the war effort.'liii 
The most important difference between the Hague Convention of 1907 and the 
Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 was the punishment of prisoners of war by 
the detaining state. The 1907 Convention had called for the punishment of prisoners of 
war to be equal to the punishment that would be given for a violation by a member of that 
state's armed forces. The Geneva Convention of 1929 removed the use of corporal 
punishment stating that: 
Prisoners of war shall not be subjected by the military authorities or the 
tribunals of the detaining Power to penalties other than those which are 
prescribed for similar acts by members of the national forces. Officers, 
non-commissioned officers or private soldiers, prisoners of war, 
undergoing disciplinary punishment shall not be subjected to treatment less 
favourable than that prescribed, as regards the same punishment, for 
similar ranks in the armed forces of the detaining Power. All forms of 
corporal punishment, confinement in premises not lighted by daylight and, 
in general, all forms of cruelty whatsoever are prohibited. Collective 
penalties for individual acts are also prohibited.'liv 
The article from the 1929 Convention also prohibits the use of collective punishment for 
acts committed by an individual. Often prisoners of war were punished as a group if one 
member of the group attempted an escape, hid food, or fell behind on work duties.'!v 
18 
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The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 was the strongest basis for 
international law to prescribe expected behavior. Although the government of Japan was 
not an original signer of the document, by agreeing to the provisions in 1942 the Japanese 
government became a full party to the treaty. With this agreement, the Japanese 
government became responsible for disseminating the information regarding the 
provisions to the officers and individuals in command of prisoners of war camps. 
Although the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 was the most authoritative 
source for international law in this area, there were other sources of international law to 
consider. 
Treaties and Conventions are usually the most reliable, accurate, and specific 
means of ascertaining intemationallaw, but they are not the only sources. International 
law also includes an element of customary law that is derived not by what states say their 
behavior is and will be, but by what the behavior actually is. This is described as ancient 
and customary usage in which the members of that state adhere to a behavior or a belief 
about behavior because they deem it to be as binding as law. 
Customary usage in international law was articulated in the Paquette Habana Case 
that was heard before the United States Supreme Court in 1900. In this case, a fishing 
smack was seized by the Unites States as a spoil of the Spanish American War. The 
owners of the fishing vessel claimed that the commercial nature of the fishermen in 
furthering an economic interest were exempt from seizure due to ancient and customary 
usage. The Supreme Court agreed, citing a long succession of States that recognized 
fishing vessels as exempt from seizure. The Court went on to state that: 
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International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the by the courts of justice of appropriate 
jurisdiction as often questions of right depending upon it are duly 
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is 
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations, and as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years oflabor, research, and experience 
have made themselves particularly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat.'lvi 
Customary usage raises many question in determining exactly what constitutes 
customary international law , including formative factors such as: 1. How long does a 
country have to follow a practice before it is considered international law? 2. How many 
countries must be in recognition of a practice for it to be considered international law? 
3.How are conflicting practices dealt with? 4. Are states that do not practice a certain 
custom bound by practices that are considered part of customary international law? In 
looking at the development of Japanese Military aggression, it is possible to dismiss 
ancient usage as any basis for the mistreatment of prisoners of war. 
Japanese military aggression in the Pacific Rim began when Japan emerged from 
centuries of isolation in the period from 1868-1937. This time period of Japanese history 
is known as the Tokugawa Era. Although armed conflict in the Pacific Rim during World 
War II is usually considered to have commenced when Japan attacked Chinese Manchuria 
in 1937, the stage for Japanese aggression was set decades earlier. Japan had been 
militarized most of its history, but became more prepared to be a regional power during 
the Tokugawa Era lasting from 1603 until 1868x1vii. During this time the Japanese 
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government created a centralized state and became highly bureaucratic due to the 
influence of the Samurai class, which became the body primarily responsible for state 
administration.'lviii In 1863 Admiral William Perry of the United States' Navy demanded 
that Japan open her harbors to US merchant ships for trade, ending Japan's isolationism 
that had lasted for 250 years:lix 
The end of the Tokugawa Era issued in the Meiji Restoration. With ports open to 
foreign vessels, Japanese administrators began to fear the modernized naval forces firmly 
anchored in the harbors. I Modernization became top priority for the state officials, and 
soon Japan was able to deploy a modem army and engaged in two wars.1i The Sino-
Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War both ended with the Japanese being victorious 
over seemingly superior forces. The Code of Bash ito, which in many cases could have 
allowed for what many Westerners would have considered mistreatment, was not widely 
practiced in the Pacific Rim, and did not spread to any other parts of the world. 
With the relatively short amount of time that Japan had been engaged in relations 
with other states and with the limited spread of Japanese customs, customary law is 
simply not applicable in this case. Japanese customs do not hold up to scrutiny under the 
tests established to determine if customary international law applies: 
Japanese military customs are relatively short lived. 
Japanese military customs are not widespread. 
There were conventions in effect that would have trumped customary law claims. 
Having dismissed the possibility of Japanese claims that prisoners were treated with 
accordance with Japanese military custom, and having determined that there was a 
21 
Stoffel122 
violation of international treaty, it becomes necessary to examine if individuals could be 
held accountable. 
The Questiou of Individual Accountability 
In 1884 the Institute of International Law held that an individual soldier who 
violates the laws and customs of war is to be accountable for his actions. Iii Article 84 of 
the Manual of the Laws of War on Land states that" the offending parties should be 
punished, after a judicial hearing, by the belligerent whose hands they are in."liii The 
Institute of International Law held that there was a distinction between the acts of a soldier 
committed in the line of duty under the rules of warfare and acts that took place outside of 
that duty. This raised a sharp distinction between what behavior was acceptable. This 
difference was articulated by Professor C. Renault, a leading lecturer of international law 
at the Sorbonne, and distinguished lecturer for the Grotius Society. 
Professor Renault states that most acts, even when the element of intent is 
eliminated, contain all the necessary elements of a crime that is forbidden by international 
law and the rules of civilized warfare. liv Renault adds that "soldiers may commit crimes 
during war, and it would be extraordinary to hold that they are protected by their unifonn 
for trial and punishment."lv This is a further articulation of the notion that the wearing of a 
unifonn does not protect every action of an individual soldier. After detennining what 
applicable international law was and that individuals could be held accountable, it was 
necessary to determine under what basis the United States claimed primary jurisdiction to 
try suspected war criminals.1vi 
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The Question of Jurisdiction 
Once it was determined that there was applicable international law that had been 
violated, the question arose as to who would be the trial authority. There were obvious 
problems in allowing Countries that were invaded to try persons on what was effectively 
their jurisdiction. One of the possible methods of dealing with jurisdictional issues was to 
allow states that had been invaded to try persons accused of war crimes in their local 
courts. This view received some support, however the United States affirmed that this 
principle went against what the Supreme Court of the United States had declared in a 
number of cases arising after the Civil War. In these cases the United States asserted the 
principle that local courts have no jurisdiction to try acts committed by the members of an 
invading army or by occupational forces that were later installed.lvii Of course, the 
problems of World War I dismissed any possibility of any real justice if Japan were 
allowed to try their own soldiers and officers for violations of the Geneva Convention of 
1929. 
The Military Commission officially asserted its jurisdiction under the following 
documents: The Potsdam Declaration ofJuly26, 1945; the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East; the Far Eastern Commission Policy Decision of April 
3, 1946; and the Regulations Concerning the Trial of Accused War Criminals of 
December 5, 1945.lviii 
Although the Potsdam Declaration clearly states that the Allied Powers intended to 
try suspected war criminals, the commission also relied on the Charter of the International 
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Military Tribunal for the Far East to establish jurisdiction. The Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal is a short document, consisting of only two typed pages. 
The Charter refers to the Potsdam Declaration stating that "the government of the Allied 
Powers at war with Japan on the 26th of July, 1945, declared as one of the terms of 
surrender that stern justice would be meted out to all war criminals who have visited 
cruelties upon our prisoners."lix The Charter then states that the Japanese surrender in 
Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945 accepted the Potsdam Declaration.lx The Charter 
concludes by stating that with these provisions, General Douglas MacArthur will establish 
and conduct trials of war criminals.lxi 
Chapter III: The Creation of the Military Commission at Yokohama and the 
Convening Authority 
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff designated General Douglas MacArthur, the 
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, as the convening authority for creating an 
implementing a program to try war criminals in the Pacific Theatre. The Joint Chiefs 
directed that MacArthur create a program that would investigate, apprehend, try and 
punish persons who were suspected of war crimes. To this end, the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trials were initiated to try the major Class A defendants by an international military 
tribunal and what was deemed to be Class B and Class C crimes were tried largely by 
military commissions. Class A war criminals were charged with perpetrating and waging 
war in the Pacific in a trial that closely mimicked the Nuremberg Trials in scope and 
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composition. Although the trials of the Class B and Class C War criminals are largely 
ignored, it was these trials that opened the way to the prosecution of individual members 
of a belligerent force in violating the laws and customs of war. 
Trial authorities, appointed by General Douglas MacArthur, classified each 
suspected war criminal into one of three classes. Class A were considered the major cases 
and consisted ofthose charged with planning, initiating, and waging an aggressive war. lxii 
Class Band C suspects were charged with violations ofthe customs of war, which was 
further defined to include atrocities committed against civilians, races, groups, and 
prisoners of war.lxiii The Class A trials were held in the fall of 1948 and tried 28 
individuals.lxiv 
On December 5,1945, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army began to appoint 
the military commission that would try the Class B and C suspects.lxv The total number of 
cases to be tried grew to 996.lxvi Ofthe 996 only 319 were actually tried, of which 142 
were acquitted, 124 were sentenced to death, 63 were sentenced to life imprisomnent, and 
the remainder received various prison terms.lxvii Although the actual charter creating the 
commission stated that defendants were not entitled to review of the proceedings or 
sentences, each case was reviews by the Office of the Judge Advocate General to 
determine ifthere were legal errors that disadvantaged the accused.lxviii Cases that resulted 
in persons receiving a death sentence were subjected to a second review and then were 
confirmed by General MacArthur.lxix MacArthur overturned all but 51 of the death 
sentences, commuting them to life imprisomnent.lxx 
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The policy that the United States would use in conducting the commission for the 
Class Band C accused was articulated in the "Apprehension, Trial, and Punishment of 
War Criminals in the Far East" Policy decision of April 3, 1946. The policy defines ''war 
crimes" in part as: 
(a) The Preparation, planning, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war 
in violation of international treaties. Agreements, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment ofthe foregoing. 
(b) Violations ofthe laws or customs of war that shall include, but not be limited 
to, murder, ill treatment or deportation of slave labor, murder or ill treatment of 
. f' tr fh Ixxi pnsoners 0 war, Improper eatment 0 ostages, .... 
The policy decision also defined the period of conflict to have commenced on July 
7, 1931, at the Mukden Incident, the first act of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, 
sending a clear signal to China and Generalissimo Chiang Kia-Shek that incidents that 
occurred prior to the United States' involvement in the conflict would also be subject to 
trial.lxxii The policy decision did not set an end date for the conflict to be considered over. 
After the primary decisions regarding the way in which the commission was to be 
created was made, MacArthur relied heavily on the Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
and particularly the Eighth Army's Office of the Judge Advocate General. The Eighth 
Army Office of the Judge Advocate General drafted a preliminary Rules of Procedure and 
Rules of Evidence that were submitted to the Chief Judge Advocate General who gave his 
approval. IXXii; The Trials were then prepared to hear the first cases. 
Chapter IV: Summary and Conclusions 
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The administration of justice is the one of the most essential functions of the State. 
When the need to administer justice crosses State boundaries, many new and perplexing 
questions must be asked. In a global environment, there must be certain rules that all 
nations must follow, whether in times of peace or in war, especially in a time of weapons 
of mass destruction, capable of decimating the human race. In modern times, States and 
individuals are held accountable in formal courts established by the United Nations, 
however, military tribunals still playa role in the administration of justice during and after 
times of conflict. 
Individuals and States no longer take actions without the very real threat of reprisal 
from the world community. This does not come without considerable controversy that is 
very similar to the controversies that occurred at the end of World War I. The lack of 
actions against the leaders and individuals that perpetrated war crimes in World War I 
undoubtedly led to the new and greater atrocities that the world witnessed in World War 
II. 
Prior to the Yokohama Trials, individuals had not been held accountable for 
violations of the laws and customs of war. Sanctions had only been imposed on a few 
states prior to the Yokohama Trials. It was proven during the aftermath of World War I 
that the only way to curb violations of the laws and customs of war was to hold individual 
persons accountable for their actions. 
The modern concept of international law includes aspects of written international 
law as well as customary international law. The modern concept of international law also 
includes aspects where states judge the actions of other states and their nationals. Heads of 
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state are held accountable for atrocities that take place at their direction as well as actions 
that take place through their negligence. The Yokohama Trials also went one step further 
asserting that countries would not be allowed to try their own criminals under their own 
laws as they had been at the close of World War I. 
The Yokohama Trials also signaled the necessity for an international court of 
criminal justice. Overcoming problems of jurisdiction to try war criminals for violations 
of the laws and customs of war was difficult in 1945. With the addition of several more 
state states to the "family of civilized nations" it became clear that in future situations, one 
country may not have a dominant place in asserting jurisdiction as the United States did in 
the Pacific Theatre at the close of World War II. 
In addition to solidifying the need for an international criminal court, the 
Yokohama trials proved that there was adequate international law to prosecute war crimes 
and that the creation of a tribunal to try such crimes was a viable mechanism for the 
punishment of persons who commit war crimes. Allied powers were able to apprehend 
persons accused of war crimes and insure that they were punished. Allied powers had 
insured that this would be possible by incorporating the demand for Japan to tum over 
persons suspected of war crimes in the surrender articles. The right to try persons 
suspected of war crimes by the opposing state was first introduced in the treaty that ended 
World War I, but no large scale trials came form that agreement. 
Although the Emperor of Japan was exempt from prosecution and maintained a 
ceremonial position in the government as head of state, the major members of his cabinet 
and war ministry were tried at the Tokyo Trials.lxxiv This was a deviation from the 
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defenses used in the past that claimed "acts of state" could not be tried, and that 
individuals could not be tried for obeying the orders which fell under an act of a state. 
This chain of rational then led to the defeat of the defense of "following a superior order" 
which was not allowed to be used in the Yokohama Trials. 
Disallowing following a superior order as a defense sent a clear message that the 
individual alone was responsible for knowing the laws and customs of war and adhering 
to them, even when receiving a superior order. The notion of disobeying a direct order 
partially led to the articulation of a what constitutes a lawful and unlawful order in 
military terminology and what is expected in obeying or disobeying such an order. This 
greatly raised expectations of the common soldier, and undoubtedly led to the increased 
training and educational demands of the modem military; soldiers now had to determine if 
an order was lawful. 
The punishment of individuals for war crimes was unprecedented in 1945 and led 
to many complex problems that had to be overcome for the trials to be considered 
successful. While only a complete dissection ofthe individual cases can determine ifthe 
Yokohama Trials were truly a case of "Victor's Justice", the path leading to the trials was 
determinately grounded in the principles of international law as it was conceived in 1945 
and provided a basis for the further articulation of international law in the late twentieth 
century. 
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